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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Sharp increases in the prices of oil have triggered two signicant world-wide recessions since
World War II: one in 1974-75, and another in 1979-81. The underling reason is that many in-
dustrial economies depend heavily on imported energy in production, making them vulnerable
to changes in the prices and supply of oil in the world market. Although it is well known that
increases in the prices of foreign energy can act like adverse productivity shocks to domestic
economy, many economists also argue energy price shocks by themselves are not su¢cient for
causing a massive recession as large as we experienced in the 1970s and the early 1980s. For
example, Hamilton (1988a, 1988b and 2003) argues that a sharp decrease of aggregate demand
due to pessimistic expectation of the future at the time of oil shocks exacerbated the negative
impact of higher energy prices. Bernanke et al. (1997), Barsky and Killian (2001) and Leduc
and Sill (2004) argue that monetary policies signicantly aggravated the negative impact of oil
shocks. Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2006), along the line of Hamilton, argue that the private
sectors expectations played an important role to magnify the negative impact of oil shocks.
This paper shows reliance on foreign energy has another potentially important e¤ect on
economic activity  it destabilizes the economy by increasing its likelihood of indeterminacy,
hence making uctuations driven by self-fullling expectations more likely to occur.
The framework we adopt to make our point is Benhabib and Farmer (1994). In this inu-
ential paper, Benhabib and Farmer show the equilibrium of a standard RBC model can be-
come indeterminate in the presence of externalities or increasing returns to scale, which makes
possible endogenous uctuations driven by self-fullling expectations.1 Although this rst-
generation of indeterminate RBC model requires implausibly large degrees of externalities to
generate indeterminacy (thereby casting doubt on their empirical relevance, see e.g., Schmitt-
Grohé 1997), subsequent work by Benhabib and Farmer (1996), Benhabib and Nishimura
(1997), Benhabib, Nishimura and Meng (2000), Perli (1998), Weder (1998and 2001) and Wen
(1998), among many others, show that adding other standard features of real economies into
the model of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) can signicantly reduce the degree of externalities
required for inducing local indeterminacy.2
We add to this fast growing literature another mechanism relevant for indeterminacy: the
dependence of production on imported goods. For some countries, energy imports account for
a signicant fraction of total costs in domestic production. For example, Table 1 shows the
cost shares of imported energy can be as high as 16% of a countrys GDP.3 This paper shows
1See Farmer and Guo (1994) for a calibrated exercise based on this model. For the related literature, see
Shell (1977, 1987), Cass and Shell (1983), Shell and Smith (1992), Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie
(1986), and Woodford (1986a, 1986b, 1991).
2See Wen (2001) for an analysis of this class of models regarding mechanisms giving rise to local indeterminacy
from the viewpoint of the permanent-income hypothesis. Also see Meng (2006) and Meng and Yip (2004) for
other channels of generating indeterminacy.
3The data for all EU-25 countries are taken from Eurostat (2006). The energy share for the EU-15 countries
is easy to estimate based on the database. But to estimate the energy share of the remaining 10 countries: Czech
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heavy reliance on imported energy can have a signicant e¤ect on economic instability in the
presence of increasing returns to scale: the larger the imported energy share in GDP, the easier
it is for the economy to be subject to uctuations driven by self-fullling expectations.
Table 1. Cost of Imported Energy as Percentage of GDP
Lithuania 16:0% Luxembourg 3:6%
Ukraine 15:7% Austria 3:4%
Slovakia 12:1% Portugal 3:5%
Latvia 8:3% Greece 3:2%
Belgium 7:7% Finland 2:9%
South Korea 7:6% Sweden 2:8%
Holland 5:8% Spain 2:8%
Estonia 5:5% Germany 2:4%
Hungary 5:4% France 2:3%
Czech Republic 5:2% Italy 2:0%
Malta 4:9% United States 1:8%
Cyprus 4:5% Ireland 1:8%
Slovenia 4:0% United Kingdom 1:4%
Poland 3:9% Denmark 1:3%
Our model is based on the standard DSGE models that incorporate foreign energy as a
third production factor. This class of models have been used widely to study the business-cycle
e¤ects of oil price shocks. This literature includes Kim and Loungani (1992), Finn (1995 and
2000), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), Atkeson and Kehoe (1993), Wei (2003), Leduc and Sill
(2004) and Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2006). We show that having a foreign produced energy
input in domestic production as an additional production factor can signicantly increase the
parameter region of indeterminacy of the Benhabib-Farmer type models. For example, the
required returns to scale for indeterminacy in this class of models can be reduced by 50% when
the share of imported energy reaches 15% of GDP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses the Benhabib-Farmer model
as a benchmark model to demonstrate our point. Section 3 uses a more realistic model with
variable capacity utilization to conduct a calibrated exercise. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Republic, Estónia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia, we assume the
unit import cost of oil or oil equivalent is the same as for the other EU-15 countries. The gure for Ukraine
is from Davis et al. (2005). For the United States, we use data from the Energy Information Administration.
Finally, information for South Korea was found in Rabobank (2006). All data refers to the year of 2004, except
for South Korea, which refers to 2005.
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2 The Benchmark Model
This is a slightly modied version of the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model. We introduce im-
ported energy as a third production factor into this model in the same way as in Kim and
Loungani (1992), Finn (1995 and 2000) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), among others.
There are two production sectors in the economy, the nal goods sector and the intermediate
goods sector. The nal goods sector is competitive and it uses a continuum of intermediate
goods to produce nal output according to the production technology,
Y =
Z
1
i=0
yi di
 1

where  2 (0; 1) measures the degree of factor substitution among intermediate goods. Let pi
be the relative price of the ith intermediate goods in terms of the nal good, the prots of the
nal good producers are given by
 = Y  
Z
1
i=0
piyidi:
First order conditions for prot maximization lead to the following inverse demand functions
for intermediate goods:
pi = Y
1 y 1
i
:
The technology for producing intermediate goods is given by
yi = k
ak
i
nan
i
oao
i
;
where k and n represent labor and capital, as usual, o is the third factor, say imported oil, used
in production, and (ak + an + ao)  1 measures returns to scale at the rm level. Assuming
that rms are price takers in the factor markets, the prots of the ith intermediate good
producer are given by
i = piyi   (r + )ki   wni   p
ooi;
where (r + ) denotes the user cost of renting capital, w denotes real wage, and po denotes the
real price of imported oil. The intermediate goods producers are monopolists facing downward
sloping demand curves for intermediate goods, hence the prot functions can be rewritten as
i = Y
1 yi   (r + )ki   wni   p
ooi;
which is concave as long as (ak + an + ao)  1: Prot maximization by each intermediate
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goods producing rm leads to the following rst order conditions:
r +  = ak
piyi
ki
w = an
piyi
ni
po = ao
piyi
oi
:
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have ni = n; ki = k; oi = o; yi = y = Y; i = ; pi = 1; and
 = Y  
Z
1
i=0
yi di
 1

= 0
 = (1  (ak + an + ao))Y:
In words, perfect competition in the nal goods sector leads to zero prot and imperfect
competition in the intermediate goods sector leads to positive prot if (ak + an + ao) < 1:
A representative consumer in the economy maximizes utility,
1X
t=0
t
 
logct   b
n
1+
t
1 + 
!
subject to
ct + st+1 = (1 + rt)st + wtnt + t;
where s is aggregate saving. Since the aggregate factor payment, poo; goes to the foreigners, it
is not included in the consumers income. The rst order conditions for utility maximization
with respect to labor supply and savings are given respectively by
bn

t =
1
ct
wt;
1
ct
= 
1
ct+1
(1 + rt+1) :
In equilibrium, st = kt; and factor prices equal marginal products, the rst order conditions
and the budget constraint then become
bn
1+
t =
1
ct
anyt (1.1)
1
ct
= 
1
ct+1

1   + ak
yt+1
kt+1

(1.2)
ct + kt+1 = (1  )kt + (1  ao)yt (1.3)
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yt = k
ak
t n
an
t o
ao
t : (1.4)
Note that the international trade balance is always zero. Foreigners are paid in goods.
This is clear in equation (1.3), according to which domestic production is divided between
consumption, investment and imports (ct + it + p
o
tot = yt). So part of what is produced
domestically is used to pay for the imports (poo). This is the interpretation of Finn (2000),
Barski and Killian (2001), Wei (2003), Leduc and Sill (2004) and Aguiar-Conraria and Wen
(2006) in similar models. Alternatively, one could consider poo as the value added of an
exogenous input production sector. This latter possibility is adopted by Kim and Loungani
(1992), Finn (1995) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996).
3 Conditions for Indeterminacy
Assuming the imported energy price is exogenous, po, we can substitute out ot in the production
function using
ot = ao
yt
po
;
to obtain the following reduced-form production function:
yt = Ak
ak
1 ao
t n
an
1 ao
t ; (1.5)
where A =

ao
po
 ao
1 ao is a Solow residual, which is inversely related to the oil price. In this
reduced-form production function, the e¤ective returns to scale is measured by
ak + an
1  ao
;
which exceeds the true returns to scale, (ak+an+ao), provided that (ak+an+ao) > 1. Hence,
the reliance on foreign oil amplies the true returns to scale when there are increasing returns
to scale in the economy.
It can be easily shown that a unique steady state exists in this economy. To study inde-
terminacy, we substitute y by utilizing equation 1.5 and log linearize equations 1.1-1.3 around
the steady state. This gives 
1 +   
an
1  ao

n^t =
ak
1  ao
k^t   c^t
 c^t =  c^t+1 + (1  (1  ))

ak
1  ao
  1

k^t+1 +
an
1  ao
n^t+1

(1  s)c^t +
s

k^t+1 =

ak
1  ao
+ s
1  


k^t +
an
1  ao
n^t
where s is the adjusted steady-state saving rate (investment-to-national income ratio) given
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by
s =
k
(1  ao)y
=
ak
(1  ao)(1  (1  )
:
The above system of linear equations can be reduced to
M1
"
kt+1
t+1
#
=M2
"
kt
t
#
where
M1 =
"
1 (1 )
1 ao

ak + ao   1 +
anak
(1+)(1 ao) an

1 + (1 (1 ))an(1+)(1 ao) an
s1

0
#
M2 =
"
0 1
ak
1 ao

1 + an(1+)(1 ao) an

+ s1 

(1+)(1 ao)
(1+)(1 ao) an
  s
#
Denote B = M 11 M2; a necessary and su¢cient condition for indeterminacy is that both
eigenvalues of B are less than one in modulus. This is true if and only if the determinate and
the trace of B satisfy
 1 < det(B) < 1
 (1 + det(B)) < tr(B) < 1 + det(B)
The determinate and the trace of B are given by (see Appendix 1):
det(B) =
1

2
41 + (1 + )(1  (1  )) (1 )(1 ao)
1 +    (1  ) an1 ao
3
5 (1.6)
tr(B) = 1 + det(B) +
(1  (1  ))(1 + )

1 ao ak
1 ao

 1 s
s
1 +    (1  ) an1 ao
(1.7)
Notice that when  = 1; then det(B) = 1= > 1; indicating saddle-path-stability as in a
standard RBC model. Hence, what is crucial for indeterminacy is not increasing returns to
scale per se, but also the degree of market power or imperfect competition.
The common denominator in the second term in expression (1.6) and the third term in (1.7)
suggests that when the labors elasticity of output in the reduced-form production function,
an
1 ao
, increases, the model may go through a point of discontinuity at which 1 +    (1  
) an1 ao = 0 and det(B) and tr(B) both change sign from +1 to  1, if the condition 1  
ao   ak > 0 still holds. Clearly, when these terms are negative innity, the conditions for
det(B) < 1 and tr(B) < 1+det(B) are trivially satised. But to reach the discontinuity point
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such that the second term in (1.6) and the third term in (1.7) are negative, we need
(1  )
an
1  ao
> 1 + : (1.8)
(1.8) is an important necessary condition for indeterminacy. Clearly, the larger ao is, the
easier this condition can be satised. To facilitate interpreting and comparing this condition
with the literature, we map the monopolistic competition model into a one-sector competitive
model with production externalities (see Benhabib and Farmer, 1994), in which the aggregate
production function is replaced by
yt = k
k(1+)
t n
n(1+)
t o
o(1+)
t ;
and the reduced-form production function is replaced by
yt = Ak
k(1+)
1 o(1+)
t n
n(1+)
1 o(1+)
t
where (k + n + o) = 1 and the parameter  measure the degree of production externalities.
This model is identical to the monopolistic competition model if ak = k; an = n; ao = o;
and (ak + an + ao) = 1 + . This gives (ak + an + ao) = (1 + ) = 1; implying that in the
corresponding monopolistic competition model the intermediate goods producing rms earn
zero prots. In the externality version of the model, aggregate returns to scale are measured
by 1 + . With this change in framework, equations (1.6) and (1.7) become
det(B) =
1

2
41 + (1 + )(1  (1  )) 1 o(1+)
1 +    (1  ) n(1+)1 o(1+)
3
5 (1.9)
tr(B) = 1 + det(B) +
(1  (1  ))(1 + )

1 (o+k)(1+)
1 o(1+)

 1 s
s
1 +    (1  ) n(1+)1 o(1+)
(1.10)
Clearly, indeterminacy is not possible if  = 0, which implies det(B) = 1= > 1. This shows
that monopoly power in the previous version of the model pertains to externality in the current
version of the model. Condition 1.8 thus becomes
(1  )
n(1 + )
1  o(1 + )
  1 > ;
which can also be expressed as
 >
(1 + )(1  o)  (1  )n
(1  )n + (1 + )o
: (1.11)
Condition (1.11) is analogous to that derived by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) in a continuous
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time model when  ! 0 and  ! 1. In a continuous time version of the model, this condition
simplies to
 >
1  (o + n) + (1  o)
(o + n) + o
:
If o = 0 (i.e., production does not require the imported factor), then this condition for
indeterminacy is identical to that in Benhabib and Farmer (1994). Since the right hand side is
a decreasing function of o, this necessary condition for indeterminacy is much easier to satisfy
than that in the Benhabib-Farmer model.
To further pin down the full set of conditions for indeterminacy, note that as long as
(o + k)(1 + ) < 1, the second term in the determinate of B and the third term in the
trace of B must pass through  1 for large enough  and moves to a nite negative number
as  keeps increasing. Since we are interested only in the smallest value of  that gives
rise to indeterminacy, we can therefore limit our attention to the following simpler one-sided
conditions as necessary and su¢cient conditions for indeterminacy:
det(B) >  1 and tr(B) >  (1 + det(B));
assuming the necessary condition (1.11) is satised.
The condition det(B) >  1 implies
 >
(1 + )(1  o)  (1  )n
(1  )n + (1 + )o  
1+
1+ (1  (1  ))
:
Note that if this condition is satised, then condition (1.11) is also satised since they di¤er only
by a positive term, 1+1+ (1 (1 )). In a continuous time version of this model ( ! 0;  ! 1),
this condition simplies to
 >
1  (o + n) + (1  o)
(o + n) + o
;
which is identical to (1.11). Hence, an increase in o; either holding n constant or holding
(o + n) constant, will decrease the right hand side, making indeterminacy easier to arise.
The condition tr(B) >  (1 + det(B)) implies
1 + 
1  o(1 + )
>
2(1 + )(2  ) + (1 + ) 1 s
s
(1  (1  ))
2(1 + )(1  )n   (1 + )
k
s
(2  (1  s)(1  (1  )))
:
Clearly, the presence of o on the left-hand side makes the inequality easier to satisfy the
larger the value of o is. Alternatively, we can consider a continuous time version of the model
( ! 0;  ! 1), then the above condition simplies to
1 + 
1  o(1 + )
>
1 + 
n
;
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which implies
 >
1  (o + n) + (1  o)
(o + n) + o
:
This is identical to the condition implied by det(B) >  1. Hence, the necessary and su¢cient
conditions for indeterminacy are all easier to be satised if o > 0.
4 A Calibrated Exercise with Capacity Utilization
The previous analysis, based on a simple benchmark model, provides the essential understand-
ing on the mechanism as to how the dependence of production on imported energy can increase
the likelihood of indeterminacy under increasing returns to scale. Now we derive a more re-
alistic neoclassical growth model with variable capital utilization. The reason for introducing
capacity utilization is three-fold: (i) As argued by Schmitt-Grohé (1997) and many others, the
Benhabib-Farmer model is empirically implausible since it requires extremely large increasing
returns to scale to generate indeterminacy. Hence it is not a good reference point for calibra-
tion. (ii) Both empirical and theoretical studies show that allowing for capacity utilization
can dramatically reduce the estimated returns to scale in the data (see, e.g., Burnside et al.,
1995) and the required returns to scale in the model (see Wen, 1998). For the U.S. and most
European countries, the estimated returns to scale after controlling for capacity utilization
are around 1:1,4 which is slightly below the lower bond for generating indeterminacy in mod-
els with capacity utilization (see Wen, 1998). Given this low level of increasing returns to
scale, it is interesting to study whether a cost share of foreign energy around 5% is signicant
enough for triggering indeterminacy. (iii) Our analysis with capacity utilization also serves as
a robustness check for the results obtained in the Benhabib-Farmer model.
We show that when capacity utilization is allowed to vary, dependence on foreign energy
can also signicantly reduce the required level of increasing returns to scale for indeterminacy.
Especially, given that most European countries have estimated returns to scale around 1:1,
which is right at the threshold of indeterminacy in a model with capacity utilization, even a
5% cost share of foreign energy in domestic production can turn an otherwise stable economy
into an indeterminate economy, making it vulnerable to sunspots shocks.
The Model: The model is based on Wen (1998). A representative agent chooses sequences
of consumption (c), hours (n), capacity utilization (e), and capital accumulation (k) to solve
max E0
1X
t=0
t
 
log ct   b
n1+t
1 + 
!
subject to
ct +[kt+1   (1  t)kt]+ ptot = y(etkt; nt; ot);
4See, e.g., Hansen and Knowles 1998, Laitner and Stolyarov 2004 and Inklaar 2006, among others.
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where the home country pays the amount potot in terms of output to foreigners to receive the
amount ot as energy input,
5 and where the production technology is given by
y(etkt; nt; ot) = t (etkt)
k nnt o
o
t ;
in which et 2 [0; 1] denotes capital utilization rate, and t is a measure of production exter-
nalities and is dened as a function of average aggregate output which individual rms take as
parametric:
t = [(etkt)
knnt o
o
t ]
 ;   0:
The rate of capital depreciation, t; is time variable and is endogenously determined in the
model. In particular, it is assumed capital depreciates faster if it is used more intensively:
t =
1

et ;  > 1;
which imposes a convex cost structure on capital utilization.6
Proposition 1 The necessary and su¢cient conditions for indeterminacy under variable ca-
pacity utilization are given by
 >
 [(1 + )(1  o)  n]  (1 + )k
n + (1 + )(k + o)  (1 + )
1 
1+
; (1.13)
1 +  >
[2 (1 + ) + (1  )] 
n (1 + )    k (1 + ) (   1) + [2 (1 + ) + (1  )] (k + o)
; (1.14)
where  =
h
(1  o)

k
  1
i
(1 + ) 2
Proof.See Appendix 2.
Calibration: We calibrate the models structural parameters following Benhabib and Wen
(2004) and Wen (1998). Namely, we set the time period in the model to a quarter, the time
discounting factor  = 0:99, the steady-state rate of capital depreciation  = 0:025 (which
implies  = 1:404), the inverse labor supply elasticity  = 0, and the labor elasticity of output
n = 0:7.
Given these parameter values, the following table shows the relationship between the share
of foreign energy in GDP and the threshold value of the production externality for inducing
indeterminacy ().
5Note that trade is balanced in every period since the cost of intermediate goods  energy imports  are paid
for with exports of output. Hence national income is given by y   po, which equals domestic consumption and
capital investment.
6The equivalence between a representative-agent model with aggregate externalities and an imperfect com-
petition model with increasing returns to scale at the rm level can be easily established. We choose to work
with the representative agent model because it is easier to calibrate.
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Table 2. The E¤ect of Factor Shares on Indeterminacy
Energy Imports Required Reduction
Share (o) Externality of 

0.00 0.1037 0
0.04 0.0898 13%
0.08 0.0763 26%
0.12 0.0631 39%
0.16 0.0502 52%
We observe in Table 2 that as the share of foreign factor in domestic production increases,
the threshold value of the production externality for inducing indeterminacy () decreases
signicantly. For example, when we increase the share parameter of imported energy o from
zero percent to 10 percent, the reduction in the externality is 33%. And if we increase the
share parameter to 16 percent, then the reduction in the externality is 52%.7
If we compare the values of table 1 with table 2, we see that the required returns to scale for
indeterminacy may vary between 1:05 and 1:10 in the presence of foreign energy imports. These
values imply that many countries are in the dangerous zone of indeterminacy. For example,
Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) found the estimated returns to scale around 1:09   1:11 for the
U.S. economy. Inklaar (2006) found the estimated returns to scale around 1:16 for Germany
and 1:12 for France. Hansen and Knowles (1998) found the average estimated returns to scale
around 1:105 for high income OECD countries (including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland,
France, West Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States).
Miyagawa et al. (2006) found estimated returns to scale in Japan about 1:075, and Kwack and
Sun (2005) found it to be around 1:1 for South Korea. With these numbers in mind, it is clear
the dependence on imported energy can signicantly increase a countrys risk of indeterminacy,
thereby making the country more susceptible to sunspots-driven uctuations.
5 Conclusion
The impact of oil price shocks on economic uctuations have been widely recognized. But
the relationship between economic stability and the reliance on foreign energy has not been
fully investigated in the literature. This paper shows dependence of domestic production on
imported energy, such as oil or natural gas, can signicantly increase the economys instability
in the presence of externalities or increasing returns to scale, because it reduces the required
7Table 2. is computed under the assumption that the foreign imported factor is mainly a substitute for
capital, hence when o increases, n remains constant but k decreases such that k + o remains constant
(assuming constant returns to scale at the rm level). If we assume imported energy is mainly a substitute
for labor instead (i.e., n + o is xed), then a larger o has the same qualitative consequences, although less
dramatic.
12
degree of returns to scale for indeterminacy. As a result, the economy is more susceptible to
endogenous uctuations driven by self-fullling expectations.
13
6 Appendix 1
Given B =M1 1M2; we have det(B) = det(M2)
det(M1) . Straightforward re-arrangement shows that
det(B) =
1

2
41 + (1 + )(1  (1  )) (1 )(1 ao)
1 +    (1  ) an1 ao
3
5 :
Also, given
B =
"
b11 b12
b21 b22
#
we have tr(B) = b11 + b22, with8<
: b11 =

s
(1+)ak
(1+)(1 ao) an
+ 1  
b22 =
(1+)(1 ao) an
(1+)(1 ao) (1 )an
 
h

s
(1+)ak
(1+)(1 ao) an
  
i h
(1 (1 ))(an+(1+)(ak+ao 1))
(1+)(1 ao) (1 )an
i :
Re-arrangement gives
tr(B) = 1 + det(B) +
(1  (1  ))(1 + )

1 ao ak
1 ao

 1 s
s
1 +    (1  ) an1 ao
:

7 Appendix 2
Denote t as the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint, the rst order conditions
with respect to fc; n; e; o; kg and the budget constraint are given respectively by
1
ct
= t (A)
bn1+t = tn (etkt)
k(1+) n
n(1+)
t o
o(1+)
t (B)
k
yt
kt
= et (C)
oyt = ptot (D)
t = t+1

k
yt+1
kt+1
+ 1 
1

et+1

(E)
ct + kt+1   (1 
1

et )kt = (1  o)yt: (F)
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To simplify the analysis, we use equation (C) to substitute out e in the production function to
get
yt = Ak
k(1+)k
t n
n(1+)n
t o
o(1+)n
t (G)
where k 
 1
 k(1+)
; n 

 k(1+)
. Next, we use equation (D) to substitute out o in the
production function (G) to get
yt = ~Ak
k(1+)k
1 o(1+)n
t n
n(1+)n
1 o(1+)n
t : (H)
After similar substitutions in all equations, the above equation system is reduced to
ct =
n
b
yt
n1+t
(A0)
ct+1 = ct

(1 
1

)k
yt+1
kt+1
+ 1

(B0)
ct + kt+1   kt = (1  o  
k

)yt (C
0)
where the production function is given by (H). Denote a  k(1+)k1 o(1+)n ; b
  n(1+)n1 o(1+)n ,
log-linearize the above equations (A0-C0) around the steady state and substitute out ct using
(A0), we have the following simplied 2-variable system:
(1 + (a   1))k^t+1 + (b
   (1 + ))n^t+1 = a
k^t + (b
   (1 + ))n^t
k^t+1 = k^t +

(1  o)

k
  1

(1 + )n^t
or
M1
"
k^t+1
n^t+1
#
=M2
"
k^t
n^t
#
where
M1 =
"
1 + (a   1) b   (1 + )
1 0
#
M2 =
"
a b   (1 + )
1
h
(1  o)

k
  1
i
(1 + )
#
:
Hence, the Jacobian is given by
B =M 11 M2 =
2
4 1
h
(1  o)

k
  1
i
(1 + )
(1 )(1 a)
1+ b
1+ b+(1+(a 1))
h
(1 o)

k
 1
i
(1+)
1+ b
3
5 ;
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which implies that the determinate and the trace of B are given by (after simplication and
re-arrangement):
det (B) =
1

"
1 +
(1 + ) (1  ) +  (1 + ) (k   (1  o) )
a
k
(b   (1 + ))
#
tr(B) = 1 + det(B) +
(1  )(1  a)
h
(1  o)

k
  1
i
(1 + )
1 +    b
:
Following the same discussions in section 3, it can be shown that the value of  that satises
the condition, det(B) >  1; also satises the condition, b > 1 + , hence the necessary and
su¢cient conditions for indeterminacy can be limited to the value of  that satisfy:
det(B) >  1 and tr(B) >  (1 + det(B)):
These two conditions imply the conditions in proposition 4.1
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